"Analysts differed on several important aspects of these programs and those debates were spelled out in the estimate," Tenet said. "They never said there was an imminent threat. Rather, they painted an objective assessment for our policy-makers of a brutal dictator who was continuing his efforts to deceive and build programs that might constantly surprise us and threaten our interests. No one told us what to say or how to say it."
But did President Bush call Iraq an imminent threat? No, he said:
"Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option."
Tenet's testimony continues:
"Since the war we have found an aggressive Iraqi missile program concealed from the international community.
"In fact, [former top U.S. weapons inspector] David Kay just last fall said that the Iraq Survey Group, quote, 'discovered sufficient evidence to date to conclude that the Iraqi regime was committed to delivery system improvements that would have, if Operation Iraqi Freedom had not occurred, dramatically breached U.N. restrictions placed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War,' " Tenet said.
"We have also found that Iraq had plans and advanced design work for a liquid-propellant missile with ranges of up to 1,000 kilometers; activity that Iraq did not report to the U.N. and which could have placed large portions of the Middle East in jeopardy.
"Significantly, the Iraq Survey Group has also confirmed prewar intelligence that Iraq was in secret negotiations with North Korea to obtain some of its most dangerous missile technology," Tenet said. "My provisional bottom line on missiles: We were generally on target.
Tenet said U.S. intelligence had evidence to suggest that Saddam planned to restart his efforts to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, that U.N. inspectors were unable to fully account for Iraq's pre-1991 arsenal and had intelligence gathered after inspectors left in 1998 to suggest Iraq was trying to conceal prohibited weapons.
"Together, this information provided a solid basis on which to estimate whether Iraq did or did not have weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them," Tenet said. "It is important to underline the word estimate, because not everything we analyze can be known to a standard of absolute proof."